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Book Reviews 
Phoenix II: Uncollected, Unpublished, and Other Prose Works by D. H. 
Lawrence, edited by Warren Roberts and Harry T. Moore. New York: 
Viking Press, 1968. Pp. 640. $12.50. 
One of the dividends deriving from the D. H. Lawrence boom of the 1950'5 
and 60's has been its having encouraged publishers and editors to make ail of 
his writings, major or minor, conveniently accessible. Thus in 1962 appeared 
two volumes of the letters, in 1964, Tbe Complete Poems, and in 1965 The Com~ 
plete Plays. And now appears this fat and handsome 640 page volume of 
sketches, stories, essays, translations, book reviews and what not. The overall idea 
of compiling Phoenix II was an admirable one, and commendations, despite the 
acrimonious notc which is supposed to be struck when greeting publications 
devoted to Lawrence, are certainly in order here. 
In an essay on The Rainbow Herbert Lindenberger makes the point that it 
is difficult to approach anyone of Lawrence's works (except the tales) "as an 
independent, self-sustained entity in the way we can, say, Madame Bovary or 
Tom Jones: even a work like Women in Love would give the reader who is 
unfamiliar with anything else by or about Lawrence little sense of its meaning 
or stature. One could speak of a sort of overflow principle in his work (' over-
flow' was what Wordsworth called those passages which he could not accom-
modate in his poems) whereby the interests ... and mannerisms of one novel 
flow •.. into the travel books, poems, letters, and essays."'" More than thirty 
years ago an awareness of the value of these" overflow 11 writings led Edward D. 
McDonald to compile his collection of Lawrence's posthumous papers, Phoenix 
(1936), a complilation that has become an indispensable desk-book. Anyone 
engaged in the difficult task of trying to understand The Rainbow, for example, 
will be obliged to McDonald for having made available the "Study of Thomas 
Hardy" which Lawrence wrote at the time he was planning his novel. In recent 
years, however, copies of the original Pboenix have become expensive and hard 
to come by, and it was a good idea to reissue it, with only a slight change of title 
(Pboenix 1, price $12.50), its reappearance coinciding with the publication of this 
second collection, Phoenix II. 
As for unpublished materials in Pboenix II, the pickings, after thirty years, 
were inevitably thinner. About a third of Pboenix I was taken up with items 
never previously published; only 47 pages of Pboenix II are of tIlls category. 
What Messrs. Roberts and Moore have sought out, instead, are collections Of 
single items that have become generally inaccessible. Thus they reprint the 
entire collection, Reflections on tbe Deatb of a Porcupine (1925) which includes 
that key essay for an understanding of personal relations in Lawrence's fiction, 
The Crown. Also reprinted in full is Assorted Articles (1930). From A Modern 
• "Lawrence and the Romantic Tradition 11 in A D. H. Lawrence Miscellany, 
ed. H. T. Moore, Carbondale, Illinois, 1959, pp. 339-40. 
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Lovet (1934) they reprint Mr. Noo1l, but for some odd reason omit the other 
six stories in that volume. Despite some lively sections, Mr. Noon, as I have 
argued el~ewhere, is perhaps the worst story Lawrence ever published. For 
compensatIOn, however, we have here the masterful sketch of Maurice Magnus 
which Lawrence himself once described as his finest piece of writing. To have 
this work available again between hard covers is almost enough in itself to 
justify the price of the whole volume. 
Among the unpublished pieces, perhaps the most interesting is an autobiogra-
phical account of Lawrence's return to Eastwood where he has a confrontation 
with his mother's "bourgeois" spirit. This valuable item was obtained from a 
manuscript in the University of Cincinnati collection which previous editors 
had vainly tried to secure for publication. Also of interest are t\Vo early accounts 
of Lawrence's school-teaching which can provide interesting comparisons for the 
scenes of Ursula's classroom experiences in Tbe Rainbow. 
In addition to the unpublished pieces there are several uncollected items which 
will be new to many readers. Two short stories, in this category, are of special 
interest, The Mortal Coil, an impressive story in its own right, and The Thimble 
which presents an early version of a situation Lawrence was to explore in variety 
of ways in later stories and novels. In this 1917 version, a wounded English 
officer returns from the front to his high-strung wife in London. Because of his 
having almost died, he has a new perspective on their relationship; despite his 
disfigurement (his jaw has been shot away) he talks now of resurrection through 
love. As the editors remark, The Thimble was later "rewritten n as The Lady-
bird, but one should note that it was alsQ "rewritten" as The Man WhO' Died 
and as Lady Chatterley's Lover. If the wounding is a smashed jaw instead of 
smashed genitals, the man who almost died may win his way back to life and 
bring the woman through with him. In the other situation, where the husband 
is literally or figuratively maimed, deliverance is delegated to the dark outsider, 
Count Psanek in the story or Mellors in the novel. The Blind Man too, although 
at a greater remove, provides another variation on the basic situation set up in 
this short short story. 
Also of special interest in the category of relatively unknown pieces is an 
opening chapter Lawrence wrote for Women in Love, entitled Prologue, which 
he later discarded. It is fascinating to see how Lawrence originally planned to 
open his book as well as close it with the focus not on the sisters but on 
the two men, Birkin and Gerald, and especially how he boldly explores the 
problem of Birkin's preference for physical contact with the male body rather 
than the female. Because it was my good fortune to have stumbled on this 
opening chapter in the vast Texas collection and to have edited it with' a critical 
introduction (Texas Quarterly, Spring, 1963) my recommending it as one of the 
most important items in Phoenix II may be written off as mere parental partiality, 
but I do not think I am exaggerating its importance for an understanding of 
Lawrence's greatest novel. To have the chapter between hard covers is also 
welcome. 
The enthusiasm with which I have been speaking of tIlls smorgasbord collection 
may sound like Mr. Chadband after a feast (H 0 let us be joyful! "), but one 
reservation needs to be aired. Messrs. Roberts and Moore have elected to 
! organize the sixty-one pieces in the collection into seven sections under headings 
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such as "Stories and Skcrchcs,11 "Essays," and then of volumes previously col-
lected such as Assorted Articles. The task of grouping pieces that relate to each 
other is thus left to the reader or to future editors. Because so many of Lawrence's 
pieces are mixtures of essay, autobiography, and fiction, it would have been 
difficult to try to sort out these sixty-one pieces and to impose some more cogent 
form of order, as McDonald tried to do in the original Phoenix, but despite the 
difficulty it is a tasld worth considering. We could then have a section of Auto-
biography, another of literary criticism (including reviews), a section of what 
Lawrence called his poly-analytics, and perhaps what McDonald categorized as 
"Peoples, Countries, and Races." Some of the liveliest pieces in Phoenix II are 
of this variety including a hitherto unpublished sketch of Gennan tourists in 
Florence. Under this head would be included his critical reports on England 
and the English; Lawrence's intense sense of claustrophobia on his return from 
America to his densely-populated island is impressively rendered as is also his 
awareness of declining prestige and self-respect in his fellow-countrymen. One 
wonders how Dr. Leavis would react to Lawrence's hitherto unpublished obser-
vation: 
England's prestige has declined terribly, all over the world. Ah, says the 
Englishman, that's because America has the dollars. And there you hear 
the voice of England's own downfall. England's prestige wasn't based on 
money. It was based on the imagination of men. . . • These poor 
'superior' gentry, all that is left to them is to blame the Americans. It 
amazes me, the rancour with which English people speak of Americans. 
. . • After all, rancour is a bad sign in a superior person. It is a sign of 
impotence. (256) 
Against this observation, however, it is interesting to set the following Apocaly-
ptic prophecy about America delivered in 1922: 
To the vast white America, either in our generation or in the time of our 
children or grandchildren, will come some fearful convulsion. Some 
terrible convulsion will take place among the millions of this country, 
sooner or later. 
Unless this dire prophecy materializes, it would seem then that there remains 
a task for a later generation of Lawrentian editors-perhaps of the Establishment 
variety at present engaged in editing Emerson. "What will finally be called for, 
1 suggest, will be some bold groupings that would take in writings from allover 
the Lawrence map, from Phoenix I as well as Phoenix II and elsewhere so that 
we could have a volume of literary criticism, a volume of autobiography, a big 
volume of travel sketches and others. 
And to speak of literary criticism, there is in this collection a talk given by 
Lawrence when he was a young schoolteacher entitled Art and the Individual 
which can serve as a useful lead-in to all of his writings. The talle is, as the 
editors say, "amateurish," but what is revealing is to compare it with the early 
literary papers of his young rival, James Joyce, delivered during approximately 
the same period. Joyce, despite the abundant humanity of his stories and 
novels, was committed to an aesthetic theory of detachment. Lawrence, from the p 
beginning, is committed, like George Eliot, to the principle of what he calls b 
"sympathy." And working through these almost 700 pages of U overflow," a : f 
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reader gains a reinforced sense of how this commitment contributes to Lawrence's 
distinctive qualities as an artist. The streak of vulgarity and nastiness of the 
man and writer are present at times in the present collection-a streak that 
Lawrence. hoped his editor and readers would deplore rather than applaud-but 
to offset It, and to offset it overwhelmingly, is the vitality that makes every 
page of even the most ephemeral of his newspaper items sparkle with energy 
so that even expressions of disgust have zest. "The immediate goal of education 
is to gain a wide sympathy" -said the young schoolteacher to his study group 
sixty years ago, and this volume, whether Lawrence is celebrating a tortoise' 
stretching out its neck as a classroom exhibit, or German infantrymen on a 
pre-dawn route march, or the greamess of Flaubert as compared with the 
" corruscations" and soul-twistings of Dostoevsky, is once more a reminder of 
how lucky we have been to have had him write in our century, and, on a much 
less exalted level, lucky too that he has engaged the attention and labors of 
competent and dedicated editors who have made the stream of this vitality more 
accessible to us. 
GEORGE H. FORD 
University of Rochester 
Forms of Discovery: Critical and Historical Essays on the Forms of the Short 
Poem in English by Yvor Winters. Denver: Alan Swallow, 1967. Pp. xxii + 
377. $8.95. 
A reading of Forms of DiscO'lJery under the shadow of Yvor Winters' death 
confirms one's sense of how wrong Winters was in his belief that the person dies, 
although the work of art, if great poetry, lives on. For Winters'lives as a person, 
not only in his poems, but also in his criticism. The heritage left us, by the 
great critics of the passing generation, is a rich one, as three works published 
in 1967, R. P. Blackmur's Primer of Ignorance and Kenneth Burke's Language lIS 
Symbolic Action, in addition to Winters' book, clearly manifest. These three 
books represent distinct tendencies of the criticism we inherit, and in forms so 
pure as to convince everyone of the integrity and forcefulness of their authors. 
Burke has moved increasingly toward an impersonal, technical, methodical 
eriticism; if it were not for the fine photograph of Burke lecturing on the jacket 
of the book and the two essays written on his friends, Williams and Roethke, 
one might forget that a person had written the book; surely there is no chance 
to Burke this logological machine, to uncover its scatological underpinnings. 
Blackmur, in contrast, is more personal than ever. On so abstract a subject as 
the American Character, he elicits extraordinary profundities out of his 
personal attendance at performances of various ballet troupes. American and 
European. Winters' hook lies between these two: it has an impersonal, rational 
surface, with its attention to abstract themes and technical craftsmanship; at the 
same time, few books of criticism are richer with the intimate pulsings and 
passions and sensitivity of their author. There is no need, at this late time, to 
berate the critic for his limitations or to expose his flaws to his unwary 
followers. I wish rather to show, within the limits of my own insight, how the 
--
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various aspects of this book articulate and memorialize, in living form, the 
personal character of this 'great eccentric" of our time. 
One could, of course, attack Winters at the level of thought. He was taken 
by Aquinas at the very point where Aquinas was closest to the heresy of 
Averroes, with the claim that form is universal and matter individual, so that a 
mind thinking correctly becomes indistinguishable from Mind itself. Such an 
idea, which Aquinas tempered, but inconsistently, explains the need that led to 
the Searist doctrine of haecceitas, based as it is on the concept of form as 
individual. One may marvel, indeed, at the blundering way in which Winters 
condemns Hopkins for deviating from <I orthodox Catholic doctrine." Winters 
knows Hopkins is Scotist and the orthodoxy from which he says he -deviates is 
the heretical taint in Aquinas that, had it been developed consistently, as it was 
by Averroes, would have destroyed the conception of personal immortality 
(See The Function of Criticism, p. 143). Of course, Winters himself had no 
faith in such immortality. Besides, ,:vhat makes criticism at this level inadequate 
is that this thought of Winters (" If we were all perfect, we should all be 
precisely alike, for in matters of the mind there is only one perfection.") is much 
more than a thought; it is a deep-seated impulse, a coagulation of the, whole man 
around a central, felt idea. 
Winters believes that criticism is judgment and that, to the extent that it is 
of value, such judgment is universal, is free of any taint of the personal or 
individual. No critical judgments, however, are more personal, more forthrightly 
and passionately distinctive, than those he himself makes. The fount of Winters' 
character, as man, critic, and poet, is his decision to repudiate all that is personal 
and individual, to flush down the drain all feelings that grow out of an intimate 
personal relationship. The most painful aspect of human life is the contradiction 
between the infinite, absolute value of an individual human being like Cordelia 
and the fact that, in her mortality, she seems of no more worth than" a dog, 
a horse, a rat." Lear, that gruff old bear of a man, died affirming both sides 
of the contradiction; Winters, at the expense of his "being and intelligence," 
decided rationally to affirm only the second. He realizes this affirmation 
poetically in "At the San Francisco Airport: To My Daughter, 1954." Here he 
accepts sternly, even tragically, the break in his relationship with his daughter, 
the terminatio'n of her importance for him and his for her. His triumph over 
personal anguish in this poem is one of the terrible moments in modern poetry: 
This is the terminal, the break. 
Beyond this point, on lines of air, 
You take the way that you must take; 
And I remain in light and stare-
In light, and nothing else, awake. 
Granted that in so mobile a society as ours, with us dying daily to others and 
they to us, simply by departure, this stern choice seems sane. But, somehow, with 
Blackmur's shadow close, one thinks such sanity looks wild beside the mad 
contradiction of Lear. In any case, I think it is this severe decision, realized 
poetically in this one poem, but no doubt in other forms before, that explains 
the personal eccentricities of Winters' criticism. 
The force, indeed, of the last words in this last book of the dying man is 
poignantly personal: 
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The best poets have the best minds; ultimately they are the standard. 
When the time comes, my distinguished reader, his favorite poets, his 
favorite subjects, and all of the members of his eUte group will have 
turned to dust. (360) 
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Furthermore, the abandonment of personal love on the grounds that individuals 
are mortal and that it is irrational to evade deciding betWeen the nullity ·or 
infinite value of an individual is the basis of much of what he presents as most 
rational. II Death is absolute and without memorial." Winters values in Stevens 
only those poems which affirm" the situation of the isolated man in a meaning-
less universe." (277) He says: "I do not object to Stevens' refusing to offer any 
consolation to the reader; I myself can offer none." All the poems in which 
Stevens affirms the intimate value of persons for each other by means of the 
Supreme Fiction, Winters abruptly drops from the canon as faulty because 
based upon a foolish notion of the Imagination. All poetry, in truth, which 
combines the individual and the universal, which finds value in the lmique 
person, is, for one specified reason or another, rejected as inferior. All romantic 
poetry, of course, is corruptive and must be rooted out of our systems. More 
curiously, the sonnets of Shakespeare's which he chooses to condemn are mainly 
those which articulate the poet's sense of the limitless value of an individual 
human being. The cost of writing a poem like" At the San Francisco Airport J7 
is extreme.· To focus his whole sense of life in so fine an art object accompanies, 
if it does not cause, an incapacity for the free, imaginative, critical play of mind 
necessary to respond to most great Renaissance and romantic poetry, certainly 
to that of Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare. One wishes Winters could have 
encountered so ruthless and cold and great a poet as Pet.rarch, who refused, just 
as decisivdy as Winters but in opposition to a medieval stance like his, to 
abandon his sense of the infinite value of the individuals whom he loved. Of 
course, it must be admitted that the critical freedom needed td respond to both 
Winters and Petrarch probably bars one from writing a poem comparable to 
those of either. 
Many brilliant incidental comments by Winters support the notion I am 
suggesting. Of Donne's "Canonization," he says: "I am not interested in the 
petulant conversation of Donne or of any other man." (76) Of the "Epistle 
to Arbuthnot," he says that nothing holds it together 
except Pope's exasperation with people who have exasperated him. 
They were doubtless exasperating, but so are most people; so is life. (126) 
More important, his astounding reduction of rhythm to meter must, I think, be 
traced to his decision to find nothing personal in great poetry. For rhythm is 
the vital bodying forth of the personal nature of the poet, as he articulates his 
unique sense of the world. One may grant that in some great poems rhythm is 
close to meter, and that this is true especially in poems of withdrawal, like 
U At the San Francisco Airport," in which a tight-lipped, steel-toothed assertion 
of impersonal endurance is being made. But in most great poetry, rhythm negates 
meter, plays off it, surrounds it, moves innumerably and qualitatively as the 
personal feeling of the poet. All such poetry Winters rejects as u·dramatic." 
Finally, it is clear to me that Winters' irrational refusal to recognize a 
difference between Cleanth Brooks' exegeses and his own paraphrases stems 
from his disbelief that personal quality can be immortalized in poetry. For 
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Brooks speaks of individual lines of a poem only in relation to the dramatic 
totality of the poem, only in relation to the intimate, supra-logical, personal 
action of the whole poem; whereas the whole of a poem for Winters is at most 
a theme stated objectively, and he usually interprets lines for what they mean in 
themselves. He is repeatedly referring to great lines, just as he exclaims over a 
"brilliant meter," or even a "brilliant spondee." 
Forms of Discovery is, in sum, a forcefully personal book. One is not apt to 
laugh too hard or long at Winters' laughter at Yeats for comparing Maude 
Gonne, mere Maude Gonne, to Helen of Troy. Winters accepts the air terminal, 
where" The metal glitters, deep and bright." Surely, he does it with a sense 
of loss and a sense of the tragic implications of this acceptance for which one 
looks in vain in the technological agility of Kenneth Burke. As for Blackmur, 
can one honestly wish that he had not lived in California; can one deny that 
his personal acuteness and intimacy of style, though in harmony with that 
Italy which is dying to make room for the new, internationalized Italy, were 
more than a blown and broken rose, pathetic beside the great planes waiting 
in the yard? Winters was disgusted that scientists should know what they are 
doing, but professors of literature know nothing of themselves. Winters knew 
what he was doing. Fortunately for us, he was doing much more than he knew. 
MERLE E. BROWN 
University of Iowa 
The Edge of the Image: Marianne l11.oore, William Carlos Williams, and Some 
Other Poets by A. Kingsley Weatherhead. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 251. $6.95. 
An Approach to (( Paterson" by Walter Scott Peterson. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 217. $6.00. 
It is quite proper that William Carlos Williams has become the central figure I 
for measuring our present avant-grade. Like all father-figures, of course, he must 
eventually be put down. But first the dimensions of his patronage must be 
thoroughly gauged. These two books arc among the latest to attempt the [' 
unlocking of Williams' vaunted simplicity and the implications of what Hillis 
Miller has called the "new immedicacy," his "poetry of reality." Professor 
Weatherhead's The Edge of tbe Image centers upon Williams by placing him " 
in the context of his contemporaries, especially Marianne Moore, and his ,. 
Imagist predecessors on the one hand, and on the other in relation to his 
Objectivist, Projectivist, and Beat heirs. Mr. Peterson's is an exercise in a special r 
kind of exegesis of Paterson, which takes Williams not on his own tenTIS but 
as a modern Romantic visionary with one foot awkwardly stuck in the II filthy 
Passaic." Weatherhead's study is by all odds the more important, and in many 
ways may stand as a fundamental introduction to the putative Williams 
"School." For all its occasionally uneven focus, and despite some questionable [ 
philosophical assumptions, it is both sensitive and critical, lucid and speculative. .' 
-------------------------------------~ 
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H what follows seems like a basic quarrel with one of Weatherhead's positions, 
it should be read in the context of a larger agreement. 
The Edge of the Image theoretically focuses very intensely upon its title. 
The poetry it is concerned with is, broadly intexpreted, a poetry which retains 
the fidelity of objective imagery. This poetry, primarily that of Marianne Moore 
and Williams, "represent(s) objects and scenes clearly and preserve(s) the 
hard contours of these representations against the kind of blurring and softening 
that they suffer in other kinds of poetry." If the teno "represents" were not 
so deliberately employed here and elsewhere, one might accuse Professor 
Weatherhead of casnally ignoring a crucial distinction of modern poetry, begin-
ning with Pound's early formulations that the Image "presents" and does not 
"represent," hence that the essential quality of the "image" is not its visual 
quality. Pound, of course, distinguished the Image from imagery, and Weather~ 
head's interest is apparently with the latter. Weatherhead is trying to define the 
right side of a spectrum of poetic style that moves from the subjective (romantic 
U blurring and softening" effects) to the objective (defined images representing 
a concrete world)-from, as he unfortunately chooses to call them, a poetry of 
imagination to a poetry of fancy. Perhaps the most questionable thing about the 
hook is this reliance on Coleridgean terms, themselves derived from associational 
psychology, which are in rum interpreted in the light of I. A. Richards' 
psychologizing of the Coleridgean imagination. In other words, Weatherhead 
leaves himself with the nearly impossible philosophical problem of defining at 
just what point the synthesizing (and blurring) effect of imagiuation, which 
subordinates all objects to the central subjective meaning or theme, gives way to 
objectivity or fancy's arrangement of things-as-they-are into patterns which 
manifest first the thing, then the new context, and last of all any meaning the 
things in arrangement might have as they consort in the flow of the poem. 
Presumably, a poetry of fancy effaces the person of the maker-but of 
course it cannot. And Weatherhead does not concern himself with the motty 
problem of the difference between things and language, and thus the ontological 
question of the reality of images, hard or soft. For all his fudging of terms, 
Weatherhead only ends up by asserting that fancy "represents" objectivity 
because it does not subordinate individual images to theme, and imagination 
represents some subjective or abstract theme or unity or meaning which at 
once precedes the images and transcends them. The point is, a psychological 
explanation of subjectivity and objectivity in poetic language can only end, as 
Weatherhead's does, by offering an elastic measure for distinguishing images by 
texture and arbitrary points at which the one flows into the other-as witness 
his attempt to place Wallace Stevens' imagination on the edge of, if not 
satisfactorily within, the realm of fancy. With a metaphysical (either epistem-
ological or ontological) as opposed to psychological (in that it attributes the 
kind of image to a thematic cause) perspective, he could have first defined 
Stevens' imagination in its secular (and non-mystical) limitations, and then related 
its imagistic products to the phenomenology of modern subjectivity. Moreover, 
Weatherhead is forced to speak of images as edge.d or as concrete, transparent 
tropes, presuming a common otherness as the first cause of a poetry of fancy; 
while a unique subjectivity is the first cause of poems of imagination. 
All of this is to say, however, that Weatherhead tries to do with psychological 
distinctions what critics like Merleau-Ponty, Georges Poulet, and more recently 
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Hillis Miller have done with less arbitrariness by looking at subjectivity not as 
dualistic but as of a piece, and thus looking at objectivity and reality in poetry 
in terms of an ontological theory of language. For when Weatherhead is 
analyzing images in themselves, or as they function in the flow of the poem, and 
especially when he is examining the achievement of Williams, he is acutely aware 
of the unified role and the unifying function of the subject (call it imagination 
Of fancy) in any creative process. He knows that the subject is the constitutive 
agent of images. And he is thus aware that to categorize the product, the image, 
as fanciful or imaginative, is in large part irrelevant to that other important 
assumption of concrete or objectivist poetics, from Imagism to Objectism: that 
what is important about the II edge of the image" is that it reveals to us the 
stance of the self vis-a.-vis its world, the reality it constitutes and not the reality 
it re-presents. 
Yet, after all his concern about the" clarity)) and" concreteness" of the image, 
about its sensuous directness, about the distinction between imagination and fancy 
-even while still defending his basic distinction, when Weatherhead comes to 
examine the work of Williams especially he notes that the image" presents," and 
what it presents is not only things but things-as-experienced. The objectivity of 
the image includes the immediate presence of a subjectivity, as truly as Sartre 
describes language in his existential phenomenology. If the image presents red 
wheelbarrows and white chickens in relation, it also presents the relation, not a 
representation of some external picture but a verbal arrangement which includes 
the intentional act of the poet as seer and maker: "so much depends." 
Weatherhead's long essay on Williams is important precisely because it seems 
to abandon in mid-course the arbitrariness of its early insistence on fancy and 
turns more to the kind of analysis which considers the poetic process and the 
poetic product to be coterminous, continuous, and incomplete. It thus ac1mowl-
edges that the "edges" of the images are a part of the world outside the self !iii 
taken over into a new (subjective) context and reconsituted. The poem manifests 
the being of the world by presenting the act of a self being-in-the-world. At this 
point, the degree of subjectivity (whether deep an~ hence imaginative, or super-
ficial and hence fanciful) is significant only in terms of the value placed upon 
the role of ego and traditional assumptions about the existence of self. Weather-
head's poetry of fancy indicates an existential self, acknowledging as does Charles 
Olson's essay on "Projective Verse" the significant and undeceiving role of the 
earth-bound consciousness in its milieu: "Objectism is the getting rid of the 
lyrical interference of the individual as ego, of the 'subject' and his soul, that 
peculiar presumption by which western man has interposed himself between 
what he is as a creature of nature ... and those other creatures of nature ... .'J 
Of course, there is no ultimate getting rid of the "individual as ego," except 
in the sense of defining the self totally within nature and the naturalness of 
consciousness; nor did Williams agree exactly with Olson. But in denying the 
basic dualism of self and world, Williams at least theoretically obviated the use 
of psychological explanations of the poetic process implied in distinctions like 
imagination and fancy. These he knew to be tied originally to a Romantic or 
Transcendentalist metaphysics no longer convincingly available to the poet. 
Imagination was for him the energy, and thus the evidence, of the self existing 
when and where it had made an impression upon its "local." And when 
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Weatherhead comes to treat this fact as it is manifest in Williams' style, 
especially in the later poetry, he is on target: "in Williams, the poetic act often 
consists in arranging the world around the self." This is an imaginative act 
in Williams' terms-seeing the world as it is, that is with people in it; seeing 
history as the language it is, the language of man's contact with, and thus his 
action within, nature. 
If Peterson's book seems to have got lost in this discussion, it is because 
its assumptions seem so problematic in the light of recent Williams criticism. 
Considered by its genre, an Honors Thesis at Yale, it is no mean achievement: 
written with cogency, maturity, and an admirable enthusiasm. It also displays a 
broad grasp of modem poetry and a gratifying commitment to criticism. But it is 
hardly true to Williams. Though written in part under the aegis of one of 
Williams' best commentators, Louis Martz, its flair of enthusiasm reflects more 
of another adviser, Harold Bloom, as does its attempt to argue for 'Villiams as a 
modern Blake whose major poem is full of marginally occult symbols and arche-
types. Peterson calls Paterson a "Romantic epic," a "sermon" which celebrates 
"traditional ideas of Christian love" throughout, and in sum a kind of modern 
visionary poem. This forces a reading which, though it often produces incisive 
comments on individual lines and passages, ignores Williams' warnings against 
symbol and metaphor, and what they imply, as well as his w2rning against the 
source of poetry's earth-bound transformations. In the former case, it is better to 
trust the poem, and even the poet. For as Weatherhead points out, if one 
brief instance will suffice, one can account for Williams' use of metaphor and 
symbol only after he has accounted for the way the objective fact (the image 
with its edges) gets into his poem. The poem yields a metaphoric and symbolic 
world to its protagonist only after Paterson, N. J., its history, its pace, its 
texture, its continuing presence had become a part of Dr. Williams and he 
(including that part of his consciousness anterior to Paterson) of them, until 
the marriage in a new context emerged, in which the two were inseparable and 
thus spoke a language of their continuing, inseparable relation. It is an epic 
in a more primitive sense than the Romantic epic could bej and a quest in the 
very post-romatic sense of a quest made in the knowledge that there is no end, 
no fulfillment, but only the recurring act. 
Weatherhead offers what seems to me an essential observation about Williams' 
poem~, from first to last: that they are characterized by a deliberate incom-
pleteness which the author's stance within the world condemned him to. Incom-
pleteness is the crucial formal element, not a flaw; the poem, as Williams 
repeatedly said, is "words at flow." Its purpose is to discover, ·which docs not 
imply a thing discovered so much as it points to discovery as the process of 
discovery. HHe leaves the poem," says Weatherhead about Paterson, "not a 
rounded whole but incomplete, straining outward toward a wider encompassing 
and more comprehensive completion." Thus the poem" imitates" (it is WjJ1iams' 
word. opposed to "copy" or represent) nature's incompleteness, her generative 
vitality, and also man's since he is a part of her and an actor in hrr. Peterson, as 
one would suspect, bases his theory of the poem's unity (its epical wholeness, its 
ability to absorb the random and contingent) on its imitating nature's cycle-but 
he puts a non-Williams stress on this cycle as bemg complete in itself, and thus 
capable of rendering enduring archetypes and symbols. The history of poetry 
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has certainJy given us this kind of nature (or Nature), but only because it has 
given us men who have seen nB.turc this way. Williams did not. 
State University of N ew York 
at Buffalo 
JOSEPH N. RIDDEr.. 
On Modernism: The Prospects for Literature and Freedom by Louis Kampf. 
Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967. Pp. viii + 338. $lO.oo. 
The brave new world that Mr. Kampf heralds as "a condition of permanent 
revolution" is one that serious writers have been living in for so long, that 
the only truly II modem" element in this book is ¢e naive self-image projected 
by its author. Mr. Kampf dramatizes himself as a representative of the tortured, 
confused modem Ego, searching not for certainty, but for a way to live with 
uncertainty, piercing to the social and moral corc of artistic conventions in all 
times and all media: 
Being modem, and naturally diseased, I cannot leave well enough alone; 
being an intellectual with some pride, I assume you will be only too 
happy to take the plunge with me. , 
For those who take the plunge, and manage to remain immersed in the soggy 
element of Mr. Kampf's prose, there are precious few prospects, either for 
literature or for freedom. 
In the first chapter the reader is told that "people in the past" had "few 
problems" about the "appropriate reactions" to the "classical literary forms-
epic, lyric, tragedy, and so forth." Then came the eighteenth century which 
brought" the disintegration of any firm notion of artistic form." We have now 
lost forever that golden age of art, when every situation had its appropriate 
form eliciting its appropriate and unquestioned response. These forms, if we 
are now to use them, must be shaped II to the exigencies of our own notions 
about reality. This might give them life." The resnIt of this activity will be 
"a condition of permanent revolution, that is to say, the condition of modem .. 
ism." The reader also learns that a critic can use any edition or translation 
lying about. He may borrow useful quotations from Cassirer, or other writers 
who have been over the ground before, without any need to consult the original; 
he may even quote from writers without identifying the text or edition used. 
Such quibbles, however, are dismissed in advance: "The hours one spends in a 
library should bear better fruit than a foomote." 
H the reader does sample some of the strange ftuit on Mr. Kampf's tree of 
knowledge, he is not likely to end up mowing much more about "modernism" 
or about "literature" than he mew before. The author blithely takes over the 
most elementary cliches of period, form and style, sets them up as straw men, 
then demolishes them with the II high degree of epistemologicaJ. self-conscious-
ness" which has become II an unavoidable part of our intellectual life." In other 
words, he has discovered the problem of the relationship between literature and 
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life-or art and reality-and because he is seeing it for the first time he assumes 
that it is new or "modern." Thus in his brief discussion of Gelber's Connection, 
which Kampf takes as a seminal work, we find that the modern play is working 
in much the same problematic way in relation to its own modality (the tensions 
between stage as world and world as stage) as Shakespeare's plays. Kampf admits 
that" plays have always done this sort of thing in some manner," but he still 
would have us think that before modernism (whenever that was) all art stayed 
on the stage, within the frame, in the cage of the past, quietly performing its 
"traditional imitation of reality to delight and teach," pretending to a "finality" 
that we modems know with our "speculative freedom" is impossible: 
The traditional drama's main task is to order experience, to make sense 
of the events taking place on the stage and thereby leave the audience 
with an awareness of life's orderliness, whether that order be comic 
or tragic. 
In this statement Mr. Kampf would subsume a great deal of drama under the 
narrow spirit that led Nahum Tate to rewrite the ending of King Lear, 
mistakenly attributing a secure sense of "life's orderliness" to writers who 
wished desperately for such an awareness but hardly ever felt sure that they 
had found it. Frye's expression, in The Anatomy of Criticism., seems much closer 
to the truth in its awareness of the motivation behind the literary act: 
. • • the archetypal function of literature is visualising the world of 
desire, not as an escape from "reality" but as the genuine form of the 
world that human life tries to imitate. 
A play is reality seen as manifest artifice. It does not" connect" with conventional 
reality in the naive way which led Quixote to leap on the_ puppet stage, or 
Pirandello's six characters to want to be the play. Such confusion reflects 
the problematic nature of life, rather than the artificiality of art. The fact that 
" real" people are actors and that life is a stage, means that actors, and the 
stage, can be an expression of the theatrical or formal nature of reality as it is 
grounded in invented roles and attitudes. This is the paradox of the playas 
the most artificial-and therefore the most real-of media. The fact that Kampf 
sat down expecting "actors" and then discovered "real addicts ... hired to 
act in the play" comes from his not knowing this, and from his-and the play's 
-exaggeration of the paradox found in all good drama. What Kampf takes as 
an eruption into reality is ultimately a purely artistic convention, li1{e those he 
relegates to the formal theatre. Writers like Vergil, Chaucer, Shakespeare, 
Fielding, Blake, Stendhal, Melville, Joyce, Woolf and Faulkner-to name a few-
ha.ve tried to teach us that it is mainly by calling attention to the artifice in their 
work that they can succeed in capturing something of the significant reality they 
seek. The film, too, in its most striking development, calls attention to itself as a 
magical strip of celluloid, capable of much more important things than conven-
tional realism. 
This is perhaps the basic theoretical flaw of Kampf's very simple-minded book. 
He buys the convention of "reality" and its separation from (pre-modern) 
"art," and calls that good which he thinks combines the two. But art is possible 
only when life is possible, and in the same ways; not when we escape from 
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form completely, but, when we find an "authentic" form which we can 
recognize as human experience. The stage, the frame, and such trappings are 
important not because of the differences between the two realms, but because 
of the similarities. They reflect the attempt to achieve a different consciousness 
of the same reality. The frame calls attention to the world within as the" real" 
world seen in a different way; confusions and uncertainties are not purged, but 
beheld with a clarity not always possible in raw experience outside the frame. 
Hopefully when we turn from the stage to the "real" world, we do so with 
improved powers of "beholding." It is that possibility which makes aft signifi-
Cartt, as it is the necessary return to Naples (and our return to our own lives) 
which will prove the true significance of Shakespeare's Tempest. 
To confirm that Kampf's mistake is this confusion of the medium itself for 
the continuum of reality, and his urging us to jump on stage with the puppets, 
let us observe him in a few acts of interpretation. In Chapter 1 we see his 
initiation, prompted by the" emotional power" of The Connection: 
The first time I attended a performance, one of the characters pursued 
me into the men's room itself in order to beg for a handout. I had 
no doubt that I would be approached by a peddler any moment. 
In Chapter 3 we share his appreciation of Bernini's Saint Teresa in Ecstasy 
(represented in the book by a small, unacknowledged black and white photo~ 
graph) : 
To begin, there is the incredible life-like quality of Teresa's face .... 
and we can almost hear her moan ... Bernini has managed to work his 
stone into the most sensuous representation of orgasm I know. The 
beholder, especially if he happens to be male, is quite naturally aroused; 
in spite of himself, he becomes indecorously involved with what is going 
on under the drapery; bluntly, he may picture himself as the cause of 
orgasm. 
At the end of that chapter, he frees us from" our intellectual bureaucrats" by 
pointing out that we cannot appreciate the "beautiful lines" in Wordsworth's 
boat-stealing episode (Prelude, Blr. 1) unless we "see that a rower faces the area 
he leaves behind, and that a peak which is initially hidden behind a ridge gets 
bigger and bigger as one draws away from it." Kampf's students and "most 
critics" have "refused to see reality" in this scene, connecting it instead to 
"some fantasy in their own minds-preferably sexuaL" One knows more I 
clearly, after reading this, what Blake was attacking in his Vision of the Last I 
Judgment: 
Qf its Dwelling Place: it is in Fallacy, and its Existence an Imposture. 
Mental Things are alone Real; what is call'd Corporeal, Nobody Knows I' 
Where is the Existence Out of !Vlind or Thought? Where is it but in 
the Mind of a Fool? 
In Chapter 4 we learn that Milton got stuck in the pastoral, a bad genre, and \', 
in Christianity which "attempts to fob off poverty as the most desirable of 
all states." We also learn that Kampf has read Empson, and that some lines 
from Marvell "are gorgeous beyond belief: They rape our wills." But the r 
highest praise of all must wait until Chapter 5, where Kampf discusses Freud: , 
WFZT'7W 
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For example, Freud's derivation of Dora's dyspnea from her fantasy 
of sucking a penis is surely one of our supreme illustrations of Coleridge's 
concept of the imagination as the mind's unifying principle. . . . 
Finally, in an almost sublime flight of imagination, Freud concludes that 
Dora, at age fourteen, must have felt her friend Mr. K's erection when 
he suddenly embraced her in a hallway. 
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Also in this chapter "our social philosophers" are roundly criticized for 
their concern "not with the objectives of our society . . . but with what 
that society is." Apparently what is is crucial when considering art, which 
must directly imitate or even usurp reality, but irrelevant to social philosophy 
where what ought to be must govern. 
Along the way, Mr. Kampf manages to ignore many of the significant writers 
and thinkers of the past 175 years, in literature as well as in psychology and 
philosophy. The vacant places are filled with condemnations of modern critics 
and academics who have not found the true path of modernism: 
But at the present time, our associations are generally based on the 
pretense that our work has some relevance to the pursuit of truth. 
And most of us are quite aware of this. It is reflected in the language 
we use; We speak of "jazzy experiments," of "swinging analyses," 
but not true ones. We know that the research projects we spend weeks 
"working up" and for which we receive sizable grants are rarely directed 
toward general enlightenment; instead their objectives are likely to be 
the furthering of the war effort or the enhancement of one's personal 
status. 
If Mr. Kampf is in fact among this despicable group of status-seekers (as his 
syntax suggests), we must welcome his resignation from the club and his plea 
that others do so too. One can only wish that his admirable moral sense 
(" without freedom we are less than human") were supported by more insight 
and knowledge, and presented with more. skill and less arrogance. 
THOMAS VOGLER 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
Music, The Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century 
Culture by Leonard B. Meyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. 
Pp. xi + 342. $7.95. 
Professor Meyer ranges over a wide territory, confronting many aesthetic 
problems and speculating freely. Sub-titled "Patterns and Predictions in 
Twentieth-Century Culture," his book is divided into three parts: Prelude: 
As It Has Been, comprising essays published in various journals between 1957 
and 1963; As It Is, and Perhaps fVill Be, in which he explores the hypothesis 
that forms the central core of his book; and F o17nalism in iYfusic: Queries and 
Reservations. 
The concerns of the book, despite its loose organization, have common 
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relevance derived from the author's investigations of music: its morphology, its 
varieties, its function in human discourse. But if it is not an embarrassment of 
riches the book is nevertheless too heterogeneous in content to permit easy 
generalizations about it. Meyer himself is not afraid of sweeping generalizations 
or bold classifications. In fact, his tendency to indulge in these sometimes results 
in untenable positions, as a similar proclivity did for Curt Sachs in The 
Commonwealth of Art, because the uniqueness of particular art works is badly 
served by superficial labels. Here, as in his Emotion and Meaning in Music, 
Meyer's categories over-simplify and are often destructive of nuance. 
Yet his chief argument is a cogent one. Meyer maintains that works of our 
O'Wll time will not coalesce in one dominant art style, as we have been con~ 
ditioned to expect through examples of the last few centuries, but that instead a 
great many kinds of art will continue to exhibit vitality, and even flourish, side 
by side, in "fluctuating stasis." For historical precedent, Meyer points to 
ancient Egypt, where a cultural "steady state," favorable to art but without 
radical innovation endured for millenia. 
There is, indeed, evidence that such a condition of fluctuating equilibrium 
exists now in mid~twencieth century culture, and Meyer reminds us of myriad 
styles that already meet the eye and assail the ear: testimony to what Susanne 
Langer has called "the madhouse of too much art." Meyer's expectation of 
continued co-existence for these and other varieties of art is plausible and is an 
expectation I share. He thinks that further experiment will follow avenues already 
opened up and that radical novelty in the media of art can hardly be expected 
after what has transpired in recent years. Since I feel that certain It outer limits" 
have been reached, in practical human terms, I am inclined to agree. I also 
agree that the nineteenth century notion of progress according to which works 
of art become ever" better" than their predecessors is invalid, though I thought 
this ghost had been exorcised long ago. 
But the more sophisticated awareness that studies in cultural anthropology and 
comparative arts have brought about do not invalidate, as Meyer seems to believe, 
all teleological theory. He assumes there is a new, "scientific" ideology, already 
normative, characterized by "ahistoncal [sic J constructivism and objective imper-
sonality." But the claims (even the avowed passion) of artists for anonymity are 
largely spurious; BouIez and Stockhausen, who make such claims, immediately 
come to mind. Meyer's quotation from T. S. Eliot (" Poetry is not a truning 
loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of 
personality, but an escape from personality.") is bady chosen. Meyer speaks of 
"avowed and explicit formalists such as Eliot and Stravinsky," disregarding the 
pronounced strain of romanticism in both artists, to which their use of exotic 
devices (and with Eliot, "radical juxtapositions"), no less than their expressive 
elements, bear witness. Four Quartets, whatever Eliot may say, stands as one of 
the most romantic poems in English literature. 
Meyer makes the mistake of assuming that these artists are telling (or know) 
the truth about themselves and their works. It is well to remember, wid) Eliot, 
that one of his articulate disclaimers may be yet another yearning tribute to 
traditional restraint if not a flagrant manifestation of modesty or even "good 
manners." That special public to whom artists address themselves seems to know 
better: its interest in individual idiosyncrasies of art and artist appears as great 
I' Ie 
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as ever and should chasten the gullibility of scholars. One cannot forget that a 
composer as personal as Brahms was long characterized by many critics in tenus 
which have been revived and put to hard use in recent years: "objectivist," 
II formalist," and so on. Yet the romantic spirit, if Brahms lacks it, cannot be 
found anywhere. 
Meyer appears to interpret teleology in a narrow sense, as limited to necessary 
and restricted ends. Yet his concept of fluctuating stasis itself can be regarded as 
the result of multiple impulses toward order. Of nature, Meyer states: U It is 
not about anything. It has no "content "; nor has it any goal or purpose." How 
does he know? And what limits is he setting to nature? Why is not art, like the 
human being, a n product" of nature? And why would the work of John Cage 
(an example of transcendental particularism in Meyer's lexicon) be any closer to 
nature than Beethoven's? Is <l fragmentation n more "real n than continuity or 
purpose? 
These questions not only remain after a reading of Meyerj they burn. Meyer 
appears to revere" science": but his sacred cow is secular and thin. He reads 
Ernest Nagel but not Edmund Sinnott. He assumes a It non-teleological" un-
animity among scientists for which there is little evidence. But he stimulates; 
indeed, I found myself taking issue with the author on almost every page, as 
he disposed of immortality, biological purpose, and ESP. Meyer anticipated 
this reaction, even welcomed it: a disarming invitation which need not, however, 
render the critic impotent. 
But I liked the book; it is the work of a lively and original intelligence. The 
range of Meyer's thought has increased enonnously in the decade since Emotion 
and Meaning in Music appeared, and his gains in clarity and readability are 
equally impressive. The concluding essays, under Formalism in Music, are among 
the most penetrating (and sometimes devastating) analyses of contemporary 
composition I have seen. In "The Perception and Cognition of Complex Music" 
he states: "It is well to remember that music is directed, not to the senses, but 
through the senses and to the mind. And it might be well if more serious 
attention were paid to the capacity, behavior, and abilities of the human mind." 
This redeems all else. Meyer discerns hierarchies. He relates pattern to 
function. He is a congenital teleologist. 
GoRDON EpPERSON 
University of Arizona 
The Fiction of Nathanael West by Randall Reid. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1967. Pp. viii + 174. $4.50. 
Parkinson's Law has evidently invaded library space-how else explain the 
publication of this book? Mr. Reid is properly pious, but an article here, a note 
there, would have served and might have saved him from straying beside the 
point. For instance, he exhumes some sources and analogues of Miss Lonelyhearts: 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Huysmans, Aldous Huxley, T. S. Eliot, Ensor, William 
James, and Dostoyevsky. But every time he names a name, he names a critic 
who named it first. So Mr. Reid pokes at the chaff a little and passes orr. 
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Entomological criticism, as Melville called it. "He took his structure, and the 
psychology which underlies the structure [of Miss LonelyheartsJ, intact from 
Crime and Punishment." Ten pages of parallels, near parallels, and deliberate 
inversions follow until one can only exclaim with the Frenchman who repri-
manded a similar wrongheadedness: "Oui, oui, oui; c'est-a-dire, non." MISS 
LONELYHEARTS IS AN AMERICAN BOOK, not a Russian. If you want to 
understand its anti-hero, don't start with Raskolnikov (Russian pseudo-Napoleon) 
but with Pierre Glendinning (American pseudo-Christ). If you wish to under-
stand feature editor Shrike as the dead god, votary of the deadpan, you might 
begin with Thoreau-in whose pantheon" Pan still reigns in his pristine glory "-
and end with Dr. Eckleburg, eyeless overseer. If you care to understand Miss 
Lonelyhearts' entrapment between Betty (would-be wife) and Fay Doyle (sea-
moaning Terrible Mother)-the typical American predicament-read no further 
than Moby-Dick; and if Mr. Reid had, he would never have supposed that the 
"essential irrelevance [of the' homosexual interpretation to any important aspect 
of the novel 'J can easily be demonstrated." Holding hands with Peter Doyle-
that was the name of \Vhitman's boyfriend, wasn't it?-is as important to .Miss 
Lonelyhearts as it is to Ishmael who is similarly riven between the values of 
"the wife, the hearth" and the great maternal sea and whale, who marries 
Queequeg in compromise, and who holds hands with his mates as they squeeze 
sperm. 
There al'e all sorts of critical possibilities. \Vhy, for instance, is Miss Lonely-
hearts a journalist, an adman for Christ, not a cleric? The answer lies in the 
secularization of the Transcendental ethos, and one might read A Hazard of 
New Fortunes for an early instance of the adman-editor's symbolic role in the 
maintenance of the social order. If the agony column may be a source of pleasure, 
then the funny page may be a source of pain. West thought of subtitling Miss 
Lonelyhearts "A novel in the form of a comic strip," and Mr. Reid righrly 
observes West's imitation of various pictorial techniques. But the painter he 
does not mention whose comic strip manner is far more pertinent than de Chirico 
and Grosz is Ben Shahn. Miss Lonelyhearts was published in 1933; in 1932 
Shahn exhibited his comic strip-like series on Sacco and Vanzetti. Whether West 
saw these paintings we cannot say, but we recognize in them a cognate spirit, the 
heart of Miss Lonelyhearts: viciousness, compassion, suffering, irony, horror, 
wit, innocence. 
These characteristics are pitched to madness in West's last novel, The Day of 
the Locust (1939), whose protagonist is a painter. Mr. Reid emphasizes West's 
theatrical metaphors, the manner of his artifice and parody, but misses the point 
of Tod Hackett's profession. Renouncing Winslow Homer and "Thomas 
Ryder" (West's portmanteau error for Thomas Eakins and Albert Ryder), 
renouncing Goya, Daumier, and Hogarth, Hackett takes refuge in certain seven-
teenth and eighteenth century Italians, Rosa, Guardi, Magnasco. He has 
begun to paint The Burning of Los Angeles. 
Across the top, parallel with the frame, he had drawn the burning city, 
a great bonfire of architectural styles, ranging from Egyptian to Cape 
Cod colonial. Through the center, winding from left to right, was a 
long hill street and down it, spilling into the middle foreground, came 
the mob carrying baseball bats and torches. For the faces of its members, 
~I 
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he was using the innumerable sketches he had made of the people who 
come to Califor:nia to die; the cultists of all sorts economic as well as 
r.eligiolls, the wave, airplane, funeral and previe~ watchers-all those 
poor devils who can only be stirred by the promise of miracles and then 
only to violence. 
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Why this reactionary history painting-inconceivable after Guernica.? '\Vhy thi.;; 
decadent appreciation of third-rate artists-not even Puanesi? Miss Lonelyhearts 
is decent and sensitive, but Tad Hackett is decent and mediocre, a hack. Human 
diminishment, like the dehumanization of love and religion, is central to West's 
progress. In Tbe Day of tbe Locust only the vicious dwarf loves-he puts the 
wounded head of his cock into his mouth; and only the rampaging mob 
worships, a scene of terror which prefigures the race riot at the end of 
Invisible Man. Sexual frustration and religious despair lead to political apocalypse. 
A Cool Million (1934) describes the triumph of American fascism. It is, to 
be sure, the least of West's three novels-at his best, West hurts us as he amuses; 
here he just amuses-but it is incontestably superior to Tbe Dream Life of Balsa 
Snell (1931), West's schoolboyish novella. Which makes it all the more 
disproportionate that Ml'. Reid should devote a long exegesis to the slightest text 
and leave A Cool Million virtually unexplored. Lemuel Pitkin, American 
schlemiel, is as methodically dismembered as Yossarian's squadron, but poor 
Pitkin hasn't finally a chance to jump. Instead he becomes a martyr to Shagpokc 
Whipple's totalitarian cause, Shagpoke who sounds like W. C. Fields and who 
raises the flag every day like Barry Goldwater. Needless to say, it is a cause 
oUT dim young man does not understand in life, though in death he is as effective-
ly misrepresented by the orator as that other martyr Billy Budd is by the 
journalist. Christ will save us in eternity, but Claggart and Whipple triumph in 
time. Melville's last bitter joke-the power of blackness edged with a divine 
comedy-is West's point of departure. 
In Miss Lonelyhearts West had written: "Man has a tropism for order .... 
The physical world has a tropism for disorder, entropy." In the charge of 
his divine madness Miss Lonelyhearts would embrace Peter Doyle and make the 
cripple whole. He is shot accidentally for his effort. In A Cool Million Lemuel 
Pitkin begins his final speech on behalf of political order: "I am a clown ... 
but there are times when even clowns must grow serious. This is such a time. 
I .... " Then he is shot by an assassin. Yet it is one thing to be overcome by 
entropy, another to yield to it. At the end of The Day of the Locust, in the 
nightmare of converging mobs, West defines civil insurrection as entropy in the 
social order; and when Tod begins to imitate the police siren, madness as entropy 
in the psychic order. 
The siren began to scream and at first he thought he was making the 
noise himself. He felt his lips with his hands. They were clamped 
tight. He knew then it was the siren. For some reason this made him 
laugh and he began to imitate the siren as loud as he could. 
Tod yields, and therein lies the true prophetic horror of The Day of the Locust. 
Balsa's dream becomes the littered shopwindow of Miss Lonelyhearts, becomes 
the garish museum of A Cool Million, becomes Los Angeles, the surreal city of 
Tad's painting. Civilization burns as if it were so many Hollywood stage sets. 
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Fanaticism as entropy in the cultural order. The key to West's art, synopsized 
in the deepening and darkening of his moral vision, depends finally npon this 
reintegration of formal experience. In this he is like the greatest of American 
surrealists Arshile Gorky, not like de Chirico or Dali who run out of art when 
they run out of dreams. 
State University of New York 
at Buffalo 
MARTIN POPS 
Byron and tbe Ruins of Paradise by Robert F. Gleckner. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press. Pp. xxiv + 365. $8.95. 
In the lengthiest book yet devoted to the criticism of Byron's poetry, Gleclmer 
eschews both the approach through biography and the approach through literary 
history and convention. He sets out rather to prove that from first to last 
Byron's poetry provides a "remarkably coherent II and "surprisingly consistent II 
vision of the human condition-a vision so bleak it makes that of Beddoes or 
" BV" Thomson seem positively cheerful by comparison. Man is born into an 
"Eden" which never exists" except in man's mind"; his Fall is "the paradoxically 
providential act of a God who punishes as evidence of his love"; and finally, 
not only does man's" evil and perversion perpetuate his own wretchedness," but 
his" , innate tendency to the love of Good' ..• also leads, paradoxically, to death 
and destruction" (xviii, xix). Man is indeed damned if he does and damned if 
he doesn't, and furthermore, he is not damned through C( original sin, or any 
other kind of sin" (12), and he is damned by a loving God. 
To prove a consistent vision of any kind in the works of a poet who prided 
himself on his fidelity to fact and who wrote "if a writer should be quite con-
sistent, / How could he possibly show things existent?" is not an easy task. 
Glcckner sets about it first by rigorously discounting ahnoS! all that is cheerful 
in the letters and poetry. Second, he makes use of a dialectical method of 
keeping the reader off balance: no sooner does one feel oneself on the solid 
ground of a definite terminology than it splits beneath one's feet into another 
pair of contraries, either one of which, II paradoxically," is likely to tum 
into the other. 
So we :find that from the first the "public-private voice" of the letters, 
",,-hich is often flip and good-humored, is "self-conscious" and ultimately 
"unrevealing "j the" private-public voice" of the melancholy poems, on the other 
hand, behind the various personae, reveals the "essential" Byron. (The terms 
arc by his own admission awkward; by pp. 306-7 he seems to have confused them 
himself.) In Englisb Bards, on the other hand, we find "a willful burying of 
his essential self in a role that is more protective than natural," that "veils 
his essential nature" (27). The "essential nature" of the most Protean poet 
in English, unfortunately, is rather like the Kantian Ding an sicb: it con-
stantly eludes the categories of the human understanding. Certainly there are 
plenty of paradisiacal ruins, personal and public, in Byron's early poetry, but 
such ruins had of course been a cliche in English poetry for half a century 
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before Byron was born. In any case, it is a bit hard to take a man at his word 
only when he is in bad humor. 
This ploy, however, enables Gleckner to take the early poems very seriously 
indeed-far more seriously than Byron took them himself, in his letters and 
conversations. One does not reach Cbilde Harold III until p. 225 j 48 pages 
are devoted to The Giaour and The Bride of Abydos, 14 to all of the later 
dramas, from Marino F aliera and Sardanapalus to Cain. There is much sensible 
criticism here, but comparatively little is concerned with the actual texture 
or technique of the verse, and in spite of Gleclmer's generous quotations (or 
perhaps ,because of them), one still doubts that this early and in most respects 
conventional verse warrants or rewards such extensive treatment. Much of the 
criticism is concerned to prove that the b~wildering shifts in voice or personae 
(especially in such poems as The Giaour and Childe Harold I and II), which 
most readers have taken to be confused, are actually purposeful, even deliberate. 
But most goes to demonstrate the persistence of Byron's pessimistic "vision." 
It is in this connection, for instance, that Tbe Bride of Abydos proves to 
be "Byron's Hamlet," and Byron's "seriousness of purpose" in the poem is 
attested by the fact that the borrowings from Hamlet are conscious and 
deliberate. All one can say of tIus, I suppose, is tIlat perhaps they are, but 
one would rather they were not (they seem to me more mechanical than 
material). This is not to say that these verse romances are not worth reading: 
for the general reader, as Eliot remarked, they have the cardinal virtue of 
never being dull; for the scholar, they present an aspect of Romanticism of great 
historical importance. Nevertheless the apparent effrontery of such comparisons 
surely does the cause more harm than good. 
In the long run, however, it is probably Glec1mer's paradoxical dialectic 
which will have the more lasting effect on Byron criticism. Shorn of its 
fashionable theological overtones-especially of that loving G';od Who punishes 
man for sins neither original nor committed, and Who causes man to fall from 
a paradise which never in fact existed (indeed, Glec1mer also drops Him rather 
early: on p. 122 we find that the Fall has" little or nothing to do with God") 
-Gleckner's Byronic vision is not so very novel. A good many critics have 
insisted on the existentialist or H absurd" nature of the Byronic universe-i. c., 
on the quite un-Romantic absence of absolute values, metaphysical or ethical, 
and of any significant destiny in history and in the world at large. Most 
critics, however, have pointed also to Byron's persistent faith in the mind of 
individual man: not only in its capacity to endure, as in Manfred, but also to 
create and even to enjoy what in Don Juan is called" Life's infinite variety." 
Precisely at this point, however, Gleckner impales man on the tines of another 
ineluctable dichotomy: that between head and heart, mind and feeling. This 
hoary pair of contraries has of course done yeoman service in the criticism 
of a great deal of Romantic literature, but its inappropriateness for Byron, the 
one Romantic poet who retained a deep respect for Reason, seems to me evident 
in the drastic shifts in meaning which these terms must undergo in the course 
of Glec1mer's critique. The heroes of the verse romances, for instance, must 
stand for masculine and "destructive" mind, and the docile heroines for love 
and tenderness. Yet if one were searching for a word to characterize the Giaour, 
Conrad, and Lara, "mind" would not, I think, be the inevitable choice: self-
BOOK REVIEWS 
control, perhaps, but in the services of quite irrational passions for honor and 
loyalty, or vengeance. The" unconquerable" and even creative mind in which 
the later Childe Harold or Manfred take ,olace is ,urely different in kind; and 
both types of mind bear little relationship to that free and humane play of 
the skeptical intellect which characterizes the narrator of Don Juan. 
But mind and heart are in Gleckner's dialectic vision irreconcilable: com-
passion can only lead to despair, and the escapes or solutions which the mind 
proposes must finally" dehumanize." It is for this reason that Gleckner finds 
even Don Juan an "ultimately depressing fable for our times." "The structure 
of the poem," he writes, II is built solidly on the thesis and antithesis of the 
poet's emotional and rational responses to the world. He is constantly being tom 
by his heart's involvement and restored by his cooler, dispassionate judgment; 
and both of these dynamic movements cohere in the consistent vision of the 
universe as a vast sea of desolation and ruin" (124, 337-8). Surely this is an 
instance of the Fallacy of Misplaced Contraries: compassion need not be 
mindless, nor need the mind inevitably II dehwnaruze." But if the message of 
Don Juan is that man's hope for salvation consists precisely in an honest and 
reasoning compassion, then Byron's vision is neither so paradoxical nor so 
desperate as Gleckner would have one believe. 
Some of Byron's poetry does deserve the attention which Gleckner gives it, 
but one wishes that he had spent more time in intelligent general criticism-
as in his chapter on the themes and "image clusters" in Chi/de Harold IV-
and had not '0 hung up his study on a thesis which seems no very ,olid peg. 
On the whole he has been quite just and generous with his predecessors. In 
the matter of his mind-heart, masculine-feminine contraries, however, he twice 
cites D. H. Lawrence, but not in this regard G. Wilson Knight, who I believe 
deserves credit for a rather more subtly-conceived dichotomy than Gleckner's 
proves to be. 
PETER L. THORSLEV, JR. 
University of California, Los Angeles 
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